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State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas: The Misuse of History and Precedent in
Overruling the Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine in New Mexico
By Martha Mulvany
I. Introduction
In State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, the Supreme Court of New Mexico struck
the pueblo water rights doctrine 1 from New Mexico law. 2 Originally, recognition of the right
stemmed from a belief that it existed under Mexican law in 1848, when the United States signed
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and promised to respect the vested property rights of people
who lived in the territories the United States had taken from Mexico.3 Under the doctrine, a city
that succeeded a Spanish or Mexican colonization pueblo could take as much water from an
adjacent watercourse as required for municipal purposes. 4 The right expanded, permitting a city
to appropriate increasing amounts of water as its population grew. 5 This expansive quality,
coupled with the fact that the pueblo right was paramount to the rights of all other users, was the
primary reason that the doctrine was so controversial, since it meant that other users could lose
rights vested under the doctrine of prior appropriation if a city were to grow and need more
water. 6 After the doctrine was first adopted in the 1958 decision of Cartwright v. Public Service

1

“Pueblo” is the Spanish word for town. The pueblo water right refers to rights claimed by
municipalities that are successors to Spanish or Mexican colonization grants. These rights are to
be distinguished from the water rights of Pueblo Indians, although they share some similarities.
Compare, e.g., Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 343 P.2d 654, 664–69 (N.M.
1958) (describing the pueblo water rights doctrine), with, e.g., State v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp.
993, passim (D.N.M. 1985) (discussing the water rights of Pueblo Indians).
2
See 89 P.3d 47, 48 (2004).
3
See Cartwright, 343 P.2d at 659.
4
State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 89 P.3d 47, 48 (2004).
5
Id. at 50.
6
See id. at 50, 51, 59.
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Co. of New Mexico, 7 it had come under regular attack by scholars who argued that historical
evidence proved that the pueblo water right had no precedent in the law of either Spain or
Mexico. 8 In 2004, when the New Mexico supreme court was presented again with the question
of the doctrine’s validity, it overruled Cartwright, thereby abolishing the pueblo water right in
New Mexico. 9
Although the residents of Las Vegas, New Mexico, may view the question differently,
State ex rel. Martinez is not a particularly important decision. Las Vegas was the only New
Mexico city that had ever been successful in claiming the right, so its abolition does not have farreaching consequences for the rest of the state. Furthermore, water allocation in New Mexico is
determined by a system of prior appropriation and beneficial use that is not affected by the
elimination of the doctrine. As a result, State ex rel. Martinez is not likely to have much of an
impact on the body of New Mexico water law as a whole. Nor is the opinion in any way
groundbreaking in its analysis of the historical validity of the pueblo water right, since it builds
on arguments previously made in the courts of New Mexico, Texas, and California. What is
interesting about the opinion is not its what it has to say about water law at all. Instead, what

7

343 P.2d 654 (1958).
See DANIEL TYLER, THE MYTHICAL PUEBLO WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE: WATER
ADMINISTRATION IN HISPANIC NEW MEXICO 45 (1990); MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE
HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 1550–1850, 35, 159 (1984); NORRIS
HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER 1770S–1990S, 45 (1992);
Jefferson E. LeCates, Water Law—The Effect of Acts of the Sovereign on the Pueblo Rights
Doctrine in New Mexico, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 727, 731 (1968); Anastasia Stevens, Pueblo
Water Rights in New Mexico, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 535, 535 (1988); Eric B. Kunkel, The
Spanish Law of Waters in the United States: From Alfonso the Wise to the Present Day, 32
MCGEORGE L. REV. 341, 371–74 (2001); Peter L. Reich, Mission Revival Jurisprudence: State
Courts and Hispanic Water Law Since 1850, 69 WASH. L. REV. 869, passim (1994); Pierre Levy,
Note Which Right is Right: The Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine Meets Prior Appropriation, 35
NAT. RESOURCES J. 413, 426–27, 433–34 (1995).
9
See 89 P.3d at 58–62.
8
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makes the opinion worth careful examination is how uses history, precedent, and the conventions
of the appellate opinion in ways that at once reinforce and undermine its own authority.
State ex rel. Martinez’s discussion of the pueblo water rights doctrine is primarily notable
for its unprincipled use of history and the inconsistent application of the doctrine of stare decisis.
Because the court’s explication of the legal and historical sources of its decision is so irrational,
and therefore, so intriguing to attempt to follow, this paper looks at the internal workings of the
court’s opinion rather than to the consequences it will have in the external world.
There are several obvious lines of analysis that this paper might follow, but which it does
not: This is not a historical piece. It does not address the question of whether the pueblo water
right actually existed under Mexican law in 1848 except insofar as necessary to set out the
historical evidence that was presented to the State ex rel. Martinez court. In doing so, the paper
does not try to interpret the primary sources that the court makes use of; nor does it evaluate the
correctness of the books, law review articles, and other secondary source materials discussing the
right. Instead, it takes the sources that were before the court at face value, and examines the ways
in which State ex rel. Martinez seeks to make use of them.
This paper also does not attempt to assess whether the case was rightly or wrongly
decided on either legal or policy grounds. Rather than evaluating State ex rel. Martinez with
reference to history, law, or policy, this critique evaluates the text with reference to the
expectations that the text itself establishes. In order to do so, it employs a formalist approach, in
the sense of literary, rather than legal formalism. 10

10

It’s probably more accurate to say that this reading borrows some formalist tools, since it isn’t
premised on formalist theories about how the meaning of a text is created. This reading doesn’t
assume that the text itself is the sole source its of meaning, or that the meaning of the case is not
created by its author or by its readers. Instead, it is based upon a catholic perspective that
presumes that meaning is produced by all three. In this way, the approach isn’t strictly formalist,
Mulvany
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In textual analysis, formalism refers to “a method of criticizing literary works that
focuses on language and genre to the exclusion of other explanations for the work’s meaning
(such as historical context or author’s intent).” 11 In the United States, formalist literary criticism
came to prominence in the 1930s, in the works of the New Critics. 12 The New Critical method of
literary analysis interpreted texts separate from any notion of authorial intent or social context,
thereby “defending the autonomy of literature and demanding that it be judged by purely
aesthetic rather than moral or political standards.” 13 This attempt to isolate literary works from
their social, psychological, economic, and political contexts has been criticized for romanticizing
and depoliticizing texts, 14 and among literary scholars, New Criticism has generally been
replaced with Marxist, psychoanalytic, reader-response, feminist, and deconstructionist theories.
But apart from its underlying assumptions about how texts are or are not socially situated,
some of the formalist tools employed by the New Critics remain useful. The basic method of
New Criticism is the technique of close reading, whereby the reader tries to “account for every
detail of a single text as a part of an integrated whole.” 15 Relying on an understanding of the
literary conventions of a text’s genre, the New Critics believed that a reader could evaluate the
quality of a text by determining the degree to which its tensions and ambiguities were resolved

and this particular reading is intended to be just one among many possible ways to look at the
case.
11
Jeffrey Malkan, Literary Formalism, Legal Formalism, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1393
(1998).
12
See GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 114–15 (2000).
13
BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 12, at 115.
14
See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY CRITICISM: AN INTRODUCTION 47 (2d ed. 1983) (stating
that New Criticism “was the ideology of an uprooted, defensive intelligentsia who reinvented in
literature what they could not find in reality. Poetry was the new religion, a nostalgic haven from
the alienation of industrial capitalism.”).
15
BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 12, at 116.
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into a harmonious unity. 16 Although the New Critics primarily analyzed poetry, these methods of
close reading and evaluation of a text based on generic expectations and internal coherence can
be applied to other kinds of works as well.
The formalist approach used here involves a close reading that examines what qualities
are understood to be necessary in a “good” appellate opinion, and looks at the degree to which
State ex rel. Martinez succeeds in meeting the requirements of the genre. In that sense, this
discussion of the case is elitist to the degree that, like the interpretations of the New Critics, it
assumes some texts are inherently better than others, and that by reading carefully, one can
determine which texts are good and which are not. 17 The New Critics felt that judging a text “is
like judging a pudding or a machine,” and that when evaluating the pudding, text, or machine,
one simply “demands that it work.” 18 Following in this formalist tradition, this reading attempts
to show that, on its own terms and within the conventions of its genre, State ex rel. Martinez
simply doesn’t work.

II. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas and the Repudiation of the Pueblo Water
Right
A. The Cartwright Precedent Establishing the Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine

16

See id.
This assumption that some judicial opinions are better than others has ethical as well as
aesthetic implications. As one legal scholar puts it: the question of whether it is possible to
distinguish a good legal argument from a bad one “is important because if we cannot distinguish
between good and bad legal reasons, then we are ultimately in a world of total subjectivity.
Power is the only thing that will matter. Our reasons will be nothing more than decorations.”
Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 737 (2004).
18
W.K. Wimsatt & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in THE VERBAL ICON:
STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY 1, 4 (1954).
17
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In 1958, New Mexico adopted the pueblo water rights doctrine in the case of Cartwright
v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico. 19 There, plaintiffs claiming water rights to the Gallinas
River sued the Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM), arguing that the company was
misappropriating the river’s waters. PNM had been diverting water from the Gallinas and
distributing it to both the Town of Las Vegas, New Mexico, and the City of Las Vegas, New
Mexico. The Town of Las Vegas intervened in the suit and asserted its pueblo water right as an
affirmative defense on behalf of the company. The Town claimed the right as a successor to the
Mexican colonization pueblo, Nuestra Senora de Las Dolores de Las Vegas. When the case
reached the Supreme Court of New Mexico, the court, relying heavily on a series of California
cases establishing the right, recognized the pueblo water rights doctrine as the law of New
Mexico’s antecedent sovereigns, which would be respected as a vested property right under the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 20
B. Factual and Procedural Background.
The State ex rel. Martinez litigation began in 1978, when the New Mexico State Engineer
filed a complaint demanding that the City of Las Vegas describe what right, if any, it had to use
the water in the Pecos River system, including the Gallinas River. The City moved for partial
summary judgment, claiming that, as determined by Cartwright, it had a pueblo right to use as
much water from the Gallinas as necessary for municipal purposes. 21 The district court denied
the motion for summary judgment, and after two appeals, the court of appeals held that the
pueblo water rights doctrine was not valid under New Mexico law. 22 The Supreme Court of New

19

343 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1958).
See id. at 659, 668, 669.
21
City of Las Vegas v. Oman, 796 P.2d 1121, 1123 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
22
See State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 880 P.2d 868, 874 (1994). Clearly the fact that
the court of appeals refused to follow the supreme court decision in Cartwright was an act of
20
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Mexico granted certiorari and, agreeing with the court of appeals, overruled Cartwright and
abolished the pueblo water rights doctrine. 23
C. The Court’s Proffered Rationale
In State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, the New Mexico Supreme Court examined
the history of the pueblo water rights doctrine at great length, but declined to take a position on
its historical validity. 24 Instead, the court overruled Cartwright because of its conclusion that the
decision was “based on a flawed analysis of New Mexico water law.” 25
1. Intentional Indecision about History and the Pueblo Water Right
Cartwright’s undertaking of an extended historical analysis of the pueblo water rights
doctrine was based on the rule that a court may take judicial notice of the laws of antecedent
sovereigns. 26 Because Cartwright determined that a pueblo water right existed under Spanish
and Mexican law before the New Mexico territory was acquired by the United States, State ex
rel. Martinez declined to treat the issue of its historical validity as if it were an issue of first
impression. 27 The court emphasized the importance of stare decisis, and said that “the question is
not whether we agree with the State Engineer’s historical view of the law of antecedent
sovereigns, but instead, whether this Court’s historical analysis in Cartwright is so clearly
erroneous as to create a compelling reason” to overrule it. 28 Although State ex rel. Martinez
claims to use the “clearly erroneous” standard of review, the law of antecedent sovereigns is a

overreaching that was addressed when the case reached the New Mexico supreme court.
However, this portion of the State ex rel. Martinez decision is beyond the scope of this paper.
23
See State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 89 P.3d 47, 48–49 (2004).
24
See id. at 55.
25
Id.
26
See Cartwright, 343 P.2d at 668.
27
See 89 P.3d at 56.
28
Id.
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question of law to be reviewed de novo, 29 and the court seems to take such an independent
review of whether the pueblo water right was a part of Spanish and Mexican jurisprudence.
The State Engineer argued the pueblo water rights doctrine as adopted in Cartwright was
not historically accurate because it did not comport with the Spanish and Mexican practice of
equitable apportionment and common use as described in historical documents like the Plan of
Pitic and the Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias. 30 State ex rel. Martinez rejected
this argument, since such a view of history “conflicts with this Court’s longstanding
interpretation of water law . . . under Spanish and Mexican rule.” 31 In previous cases, the
supreme court had declared that “the law of prior appropriation existed under the Mexican
republic at the time of the acquisition of New Mexico.” 32 Because the current water law of New
Mexico is “based on this Court’s interpretations of the law of antecedent sovereigns,” State ex
rel. Martinez could not reject the pueblo water rights doctrine by accepting an alternate historical
version of Spanish and Mexican law. 33 To do so would “undermin[e] the historical basis for New
Mexico’s adoption of the doctrine of prior appropriation as a legacy of antecedent sovereigns.” 34
As a result, the supreme court held that “New Mexico does not recognize equitable distribution
as the system of water law that survived the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.” 35

29

See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 113 (1994).
The Plan of Pitic was developed by the King of Spain and set out as the model for all
colonization pueblos. State ex rel. Martinez, 89 P.3d at 50. The Recopilacion de Leyes de los
Reynos de las Indias was a compilation of the laws governing New Spain that continued to be
followed by Mexico at the time of the Las Vegas land grant in 1835. Id. at 50–51.
31
Id. at 56.
32
Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 51 P. 674, 678 (N.M.
1898), rev’d on other grounds, 174 U.S. 690 (1899)).
33
Id. at 56.
34
Id. at 57.
35
Id.
30
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Taking a different tack, the court then observed that any reliance on historical evidence
creates problems for the law, since “historical opinion can fluctuate based on newly found
historical evidence or novel interpretations of extant sources.” 36 The court asserted that “[u]nlike
history as a matter of theory . . . the law, as reflected by the doctrine of stare decisis, requires a
greater degree of certainty and predictability.” 37 The court feared that if it were to adopt a
historical analysis denying the validity of the pueblo water right, “the discovery of new evidence
supporting the existence of the pueblo rights doctrine in Spanish and Mexican law would remain
a possibility, which would undoubtedly lead to another dispute” over the legitimacy of the
right. 38 Wishing to avoid these complications, the court found that when it comes to “property
rights in general and water rights in particular . . . defining these rights based on prevailing
scholarship would create an intolerable degree of uncertainty.” 39 For this reason, the court
refused to premise its rejection of Cartwright upon historical evidence that the pueblo water right
did not exist under either Spanish or Mexican law. 40
2. The Right’s Incompatibility with New Mexico Water Law
The basis of the court’s decision was instead that “the pueblo rights doctrine is
inconsistent with New Mexico law and not protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.” 41
The perpetually expanding nature of the right would conflict with the foundation of New Mexico
water law—the principle of beneficial use. 42 Because of this inconsistency, the court said that the

36

Id.
Id.
38
Id. at 58.
39
Id.
40
See id.
41
Id.
42
See id.
37
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historical legitimacy of the doctrine was “irrelevant” to its determination of the case. 43 It held
that “[r]egardless of whether the pueblo water rights doctrine has a valid historical basis in the
law of antecedent sovereigns, New Mexico water law, following the Treaty, precludes its
recognition.” 44
The New Mexico Constitution requires that “beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure
and the limit of the right to the use of water.”45 In New Mexico, as in other Western states, “it is
only by the application of the water to a beneficial use that the perfected right to the use is
acquired,” and consequently, “an appropriator can only acquire a perfected right to so much
water as he applies to beneficial use.” 46 After an initial appropriation, water users must put water
to use within a “reasonable time.” 47 For municipalities, a reasonable time has been statutorily
defined as forty years. 48 State ex rel. Martinez held that the pueblo rights doctrine was
inconsistent with this system of beneficial use since a pueblo’s successor would not be required
to put water to use within a reasonable period of time of its appropriation. 49 Because the pueblo
water right permits an unlimited expansion to meet the needs of an increased population, other
appropriators might have their rights diminished and even extinguished as a city’s population
increased. 50 The court found that upholding the right would “intolerably interfere[] with the
goals of definiteness and certainty contemplated by prior appropriation,” and that such
uncertainty could “paralyze others from legitimately making beneficial use of unappropriated

43

Id.
Id.
45
N.M. Const. art XVI, § 3.
46
State ex rel. Cmty. Ditches v. Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 143 P. 207, 213 (N.M. 1914) (quoted in
State ex rel. Martinez, 89 P.3d at 58).
47
State ex rel. Martinez, 89 P.3d at 59.
48
See N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978 § 72-1-9 (Michie 2003).
49
See State ex rel. Martinez, 89 P.3d at 59.
50
See id.
44
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waters on the same stream as a pueblo out of fear” that their rights would be extinguished as the
pueblo grew. 51
As additional evidence of the doctrine’s incompatibility with New Mexico water law, the
court observed that, unlike water rights under the system of prior appropriation, the pueblo water
right is not forfeited when it is not used. 52 Believing that forfeiture is an “essential punitive tool”
by which water is “made to do the greatest good [for] the greatest number,” 53 State ex rel.
Martinez held that the pueblo water right would promote the “underutilization of essential public
waters,” and prevent the “efficient, economic use of water that is necessary for survival in this
arid region.” 54 Consequently, the court determined that the pueblo water right was incompatible
with New Mexico water law. 55
To further support the position that New Mexico should not recognize the doctrine, the
court asserted that the expanding nature of the pueblo water right was not protected by the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 56 United States courts have concluded that the treaty does not protect
inchoate rights. 57 Because the court found that the expanding nature of the right that allowed
increased water use in response to increased needs would have been “a matter of grace” and
subject to the sovereign’s power to reallocate water according to changing circumstances, it
51

Id.
See id. at 60.
53
Id. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54
Id.
55
See id.
56
See id. But cf. State of New Mexico v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985)
(finding that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo protected the expanding nature of an Indian
Pueblo water right, such that the Pueblo had “a prior right to use all of the waters of the stream
system necessary for their domestic uses and that necessary to irrigate their lands,” and that this
priority applied to the acreage in use up to the time of the treaty. Subsequent to that, the priority
was protected by federal law.)
57
See id. (citing Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 343 P.2d 654, 687–91 (N.M.
1958) (Federici, D.J., dissenting) and United States v. City of Santa Fe, 165 U.S. 675, 713–16
(1897)).
52

Mulvany

11

determined that the expanding nature of the right was inchoate, and therefore not guaranteed by
the treaty. 58 The court then stated that while it is “true that New Mexico has protected water
rights in existence at the time of the Treaty and before the enactment of a comprehensive water
code in 1907 . . .this protection has always been circumscribed by the principle of beneficial use
and limited to vested rights.” 59 Article XVI, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution states
that “[n]othing contained in this article shall be construed to impair existing vested rights,” but
the court found that the expanding nature of the pueblo rights doctrine was not an existing right
within the meaning of the constitution because of its incompatibility with the principle of
beneficial use. 60
The court concluded that a city founded under Mexican or Spanish colonization grants
had water rights that are “recognized in New Mexico in the same manner as other municipal
water rights.” 61 The date of the colonization grant establishes the date of priority, but the priority
date only applies to the amount of water that the municipality puts to use within a reasonable
time of the initial appropriation. 62 Accordingly, the City of Las Vegas had a vested right only to
the amount of water it put to use within a reasonable time of its initial grant.63
Because the pueblo water rights doctrine was found to conflict with New Mexico water
law, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the pueblo water right was a “doctrinal
anachronism” that represented a “positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law.” 64

58

Id.
Id.
60
See id. at 61.
61
Id.
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
Id. at 62 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) and
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
59
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Under such circumstances, the court found that it had the “compelling reason” needed to
overrule Cartwright. 65

III. How the Opinion Actually Operates, or Why This Pudding Doesn’t Work
A. Judicial Authority and the Generic Conventions of the Appellate Opinion
The appellate opinion has three main functions: first, to intervene in the external world,
by forcing people to act in the manner prescribed by the text; second, to present a persuasive set
of facts and a coherent line of reasoning to support the court’s decision to intervene in the way
that it has; and third, to reinforce its authority to intervene at all. A court can generally succeed in
forcing the parties to act as directed, regardless of how well- or ill- constructed its opinion is, but
the second two functions, because they depend on the effective use of language rather than on
the power of the state, are harder to achieve. Success in presenting a persuasive rationale for the
court’s actions depends on the formulation of an internally coherent, intellectually sound
argument for the court’s position. The court’s assertion of its own authority, in turn, rests on both
the internal persuasiveness of its argument, as well as on certain literary conventions peculiar to
the genre of the appellate opinion. State ex rel. Martinez attempts to legitimize itself by using
many of the formulae that make up the appellate genre, but because the opinion fails to articulate
a logical and coherent argument for its position, and because it rejects the conventional use of
history and stare decisis, it fails to create the impression of internal authority necessary in a good
appellate decision.

65

Id.
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The reason that a judicial opinion must create a sense of its own authority, rather than
relying solely on the authority conferred upon it by our system of government, is that
establishing this kind of internal legitimacy is necessary to “reinforce [the judiciary’s] oftchallenged and arguably shaky authority to tell others—including our duly elected political
leaders—what to do.” 66 Because the judiciary is largely unelected, it “must always respond to
the fundamental inconsistency of imposing a separate authority on the democratic process.” 67 In
addition to staking out its territory within our democratic system, the opinion must establish its
authority as valid law, in that it arises from past authorities and may therefore legitimately serve
as common-law precedent for future decisions. In these ways, appellate decisions are always
“efforts at self-justification.” 68
In order to achieve these goals of self-justification and the legitimization of authority,
opinions rely on generic formulae. Such formulae are in large part the result of practical
considerations for the writer, in that “[f]requency of production, professional inclination, and
political routinization” all require the use of conventional arguments and structures so as to
“match experience and form in ways that a citizenry can recognize and accept.” 69 Such formulae
also have interpretive consequences for the reader, since “genre is perhaps the single most
powerful explanatory tool available” in that it provides a schema that allows a reader to
understand a text’s purpose and meaning. 70 Every judicial opinion “must somehow use or misuse
the possibility its structure evokes and the expectations that help structure its readers’
66

Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995).
67
Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 207
(1990).
68
PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 125
(1999)
69
Ferguson, supra note 67, at 202.
70
Id. at 217.
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responses.” 71 By examining some of the conventions of the genre, it becomes possible to see
more clearly the ways that State ex rel. Martinez is able to use some of these conventions
successfully to create an external veneer of legitimacy, while its simultaneous failure to make
appropriate use of others undermines its legitimacy.
There are a number of basic structural elements that typically make up an appellate
opinion. 72 These are what make a court decision immediately recognizable: the caption, a
statement of facts, a description of the procedural history, a discussion of the evolution of
precedent, and the disposition of the case. An opinion also includes citations to prior law in the
form of statutes, cases, and constitutions, and may include citations to treatises and other
secondary materials. In addition to including citations to these sources, a decision typically
contains excerpts of these authorities as texts within the text. Often, even the grammatical
structures that an opinion uses follow certain conventions, in that they are ones “identified by
critical linguists as obfuscating the meaning of written communications.” 73 All of these structural
elements are easy to identify and fairly easy to imitate, and State ex rel. Martinez is successful in
making use of them. By doing so, the text identifies itself as a judicial decision, and seeks to
claim the authority that generally accompanies such a text.
Judicial opinions also employ particular rhetorical and narrative strategies to support their
legitimacy. Some of the simplest of these include: formal language, which is often used by

71

John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 451 (2001).
For a detailed discussion of the use and purpose of some of the conventions discussed in this
paragraph, see generally id.
73
Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction
Opinions, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 75, 75 (1998) (describing the author’s statistical analysis of
sentence structures used in judicial opinions and finding that federal jurisdiction opinions contain
more obfuscatory language than cases decided on the merits).
72
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“those who govern others. . . as a means of exercising power” 74 ; the concealment of the author,
both in refusing to acknowledge the role that clerks and other judges play in the authorship of an
opinion, which suggests that the opinion wasn’t negotiated, but was simply the product of right
reasoning, and in eliminating the “I,” which suggests that that reasoning isn’t affected by
personal bias; an objective tone, which seeks to maintain the illusion that judges simply apply the
law to the facts of a case; the use of the parties as a metonymic substitute for their lawyers,
which, rhetorically at least, eliminates the possibility that the outcome was reached because of
lawyers’ tactics rather than because it was the necessary result 75 ; and the accretion of authority
upon authority, which attempts to show that the court’s decision is the logical outcome based on
previous law.
Another significant rhetorical convention of the genre is the way that the judicial opinion
takes the language of others (typically in the form of quotes from prior cases and other legal
authorities) and employs it for its own ends. This appropriation is a part of what the Russian
formalist Mikhail Bakhtin calls the “monologic” discourse that typifies authoritarian texts. 76 The
appellate opinion incorporates the words of others into its own monologue, not to express the
diversity of their views, but to bend them to support the ideas expressed in the opinion. An
opinion will often raise alternative views, but only “within the controlling voice of the judicial
speaker and with the foreknowledge that these alternatives will submit to that speaker’s own
authorial intentions.” 77 By using other texts within the decision, the appellate opinion attempts
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to suppress the conflicts, contradictions, and differing perspectives embodied in those varied
texts and make them appear to support the closed, unitary logic of the decision.
State ex rel. Martinez successfully uses these rhetorical strategies to help support its
assertion of authority. By employing these conventions of objectivity, formality, and monologic
discourse in combination with the structural elements of a judicial opinion, the text creates at
least a superficial sense of its legitimacy. However, these efforts at self-justification are belied by
the court’s flawed reasoning and by its failure to use the conventions of historical truth and stare
decisis in ways appropriate to the genre.
B. Historical Truth as a Convention of the Genre
State ex rel. Martinez’s primary failure is in the way that it makes use of history. The
presumption of the existence of historical truth is an important convention of the appellate
opinion. 78 The quality of this kind of “truth” does not have to be absolute. A practical,
consensus-based version of the truth is sufficient, but the legitimacy of the judicial process
depends on the court’s ability to determine “what really happened” with at least some
plausibility. 79 This is because the consequences of judicial determinations are very real: “[l]egal
interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death . . . a judge articulates her understanding of
a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.” 80 If
these acts of violence are to be socially sanctioned, they must rest on a belief that courts are
competent to determine what actually happened in the past and to decide on that basis the
consequences that should follow. For a court to suggest that it is unable to make decisions about
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“what really happened” is to give up a central function of the judiciary and one of the primary
foundations of its legitimacy. This is exactly what State ex rel. Martinez does.
State ex rel. Martinez contains the remarkable statement that “the historical validity of the
pueblo rights doctrine is irrelevant” to the court’s determination that the doctrine should be
overruled. 81 There is a whole host of problems with this statement, the main one being that it is
almost nonsensical to argue that history is irrelevant in the adjudication of what are claimed to be
preexisting historical rights. Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, United States courts are
required to protect any property rights held by Mexican municipalities in 1848. 82 Under the New
Mexico Constitution, “[n]othing contained in” the section of the constitution establishing the
doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use “shall be construed to impair existing vested
rights.” 83 If the pueblo to which Las Vegas is a successor had an expanding water right in 1848,
that right should arguably still be protected both under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the
New Mexico Constitution. This would certainly appear at a minimum to be relevant, if not
dispositive of the City’s right to take and use the water today. Furthermore, rejection of the
pueblo water rights doctrine without a determination about whether or not it is historically valid
suggests that the court is permitted to nullify vested property rights arbitrarily, without even
having to acknowledge that the rights existed in the first place. It may be that the court doesn’t
mind doing this because it is pretty sure that there was no pueblo water right under Mexican law,
but if that is the case, what is interesting about State ex rel. Martinez is why the court isn’t
willing to just say so.
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After examining historical evidence on the pueblo water rights doctrine, State ex rel.
Martinez concludes that despite the overwhelming testimony and documentation indicating that
the doctrine did not exist under Spanish and Mexican law, such evidence is not “sufficiently
clear to justify overruling Cartwright on this basis.” 84 Ostensibly, this is because the court places
a great premium on the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis.85 The court states that:
Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts
should not lightly overrule past decisions. Among these are the
desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of
individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance
against untoward surprise; the importance of furthering fair and
expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every
relevant proposition in every case; and the necessity of maintaining
public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned
judgments. 86
These values are certainly important, but since the court goes ahead and overrules Cartwright
anyway, the question really becomes why the court selected one basis on which to overrule
existing precedent over another. It is not clear that the fact that the pueblo rights doctrine would
conflict with the system of prior appropriation is necessarily more significant than the fact that
the pueblo rights doctrine did not exist under Spanish or Mexican law.
The reason offered by State ex rel. Martinez is that historical truth is too difficult for the
judiciary to get a hold of. Pointing to the fact that our understanding of history can “fluctuate
based on newly found historical evidence or novel interpretation of extant sources,” 87 the court is
essentially admitting that it is just easier to decide the case on the basis of a conflict with the
current system of water use. But if it is true that the court avoids history because it’s too hard to
pin down, the court in effect abandons one of what are conventionally understood to be its
84

State ex rel. Martinez, 89 P.3d at 56.
Id.
86
Id. at 55 (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
87
Id. at 57.
85

Mulvany

19

primary functions: 88 to determine the truth of what happened in a particular case, and to mete out
justice on that basis.
State ex rel. Martinez is right to say that one of the difficulties of evaluating history is
that historical opinions “fluctuate,” and that such fluctuation depends on both the theoretical
perspective of the one looking at the facts as well as on the facts themselves. 89 Where the text
fails to meet the requirements of the genre is in suggesting that these varying historical opinions
can prevent the court from doing the job of making determinations about the past. State ex rel.
Martinez says that “[u]nlike history as a matter of theory . . . the law, as reflected by the doctrine
of stare decisis, requires a greater degree of certainty and predictability.” 90 The risk is that if new
historical evidence were discovered supporting the existence of the pueblo rights doctrine under
Spanish and Mexican law, there would be more legal disputes over the validity of the doctrine.91
The court finds that this risk creates “an intolerable degree of uncertainty.” 92
While the possibility of new evidence or changes in theories is certainly a risk, it can
hardly be termed intolerable, since courts handle it all the time. In every case, the court (or the
jury in its role as factfinder) has to make do with incomplete information in order to reconstruct
the past and determine, for instance, who is liable, who is the rightful owner, whether the
defendant committed the criminal act, and so on.
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In this case, the question of the law of antecedent sovereigns appears to be not one of
fact, but one of law, and it has been suggested that a court’s process of arriving at appropriate
legal principles and precedents is quite similar to the process a historian uses in looking at the
past:
There is, after all, a fairly close relationship between the day-today methodology of the judicial process and that of historical
scholarship. When a court ascertains the nature of the law to be
applied to a case through an examination of a stream of judicial
precedent . . . it plays the role of historian. A historian might well
say that in this process the court goes to the “primary sources.”
Further, when a court finds it necessary, as it frequently does, to
inquire into the circumstances surrounding earlier judicial
expositions of the law, it gets still deeper into the writing of
history. A historian would label the latter process “external
documentary criticism,” engaged in as a means to an adequate and
sophisticated evaluation of the source in question. 93
As another example of how courts manage the uncertainties posed by changing factual
information and theoretical frameworks, courts frequently have to base decisions on the expert
testimony of scientists who, like historians, are always reevaluating and retesting their
hypotheses. Courts manage to assess the likelihood that a particular scientific theory is valid by
using such tools as the Daubert 94 factors, cross-examination of the expert, and the presentation
of contrary evidence. Historians have suggested that this is a valid method of rooting out
historical truth as well, 95 arguing that while “historical ‘truth’ may be ephemeral, historical
‘falsity’ is not. In other words, historical interpretations . . . can be assessed by examining the
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degree to which they follow the professional norms of academic and legal historians, and by
examining whether they have foundation in historical evidence.” 96 Because the court is
necessarily so practiced in its ability to take a look at documentary evidence and expert
testimony, its claim to lack competence in this area sounds a false note.
Even if, as the court suggested, “[a] trial often demands more than a historian can offer”
since it “asks for definitive answers when a historian may prefer to give cautious, conditional
answers,” 97 this doesn’t relieve the court of its responsibility to at least be willing to search for
the truth. While concepts like “proof [and] even truth . . .have acquired in the social sciences an
unfashionable ring,” 98 they maintain their power in our justice system. This is because trials are
“a form of inquiry into past events [that begin] with the underlying assumption of some kind of
correlation between our statements about the world and the world itself” 99 —that is, between the
evidence presented about what happened and what actually took place. If the court refuses to
make a commitment to the facts of a case, it undermines its authority as an arbiter of the truth. 100
C. Stare Decisis as a Convention of the Genre
Adherence to precedent is another way that judicial opinions assert their legitimacy, and
State ex rel. Martinez at least attempts, albeit unsuccessfully, to make use of this convention in
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order to justify its rejection of history. The doctrine of stare decisis is one way that judicial
opinions maintain the fiction that they are simply applying, rather than making law. Furthermore,
by relying on the law as established in past opinions, an appellate decision suggests that the law
is knowable and predictable. 101 In its adherence to past precedent, an opinion demonstrates its
rejection of “precipitate, individualized, and arbitrary action,” 102 and offers assurance that
judicial decisionmaking is determined, rather than impulsive and uncontrolled. State ex rel.
Martinez expressly recognizes the importance of stare decisis to a decision’s efforts at selfjustification when it states that the doctrine of stare decisis is based in part on “the necessity of
maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.” 103
The State ex rel. Martinez court faced the problem of how to ascertain the nature of
Mexican municipal water law in 1848. The court was presented with three conflicting views of
the history of the law. Two of these, at least according to the evidence before the court, were
essentially judicially constructed and not based in historical fact: According to the evidence
presented in the case, the pueblo water rights doctrine appeared to be an invention of the
California judiciary. 104 Similarly, State ex rel. Martinez admits that the doctrine of prior
appropriation is “based on this Court’s interpretation of the law of antecedent sovereigns.” 105
Among the court’s choices, the third version of history—that the Mexican legal system
followed the system of equitable apportionment and common use—seems to be best supported
by the historical evidence before the court, since it is argued by the State Engineer, it can be
inferred from the Plan of Pitic and the Recopilacion, and since several secondary sources cited
101
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by the court seem to endorse it. Ironically, it is this version of history that State ex rel. Martinez
dismisses most easily. This would be fine if the opinion were intellectually forthright and stated
that the court will not adopt a system of equitable apportionment because New Mexico has
adhered to the doctrine of prior appropriation since the early 1900s, and it is just too late and too
complicated to change things now. But the court doesn’t do this. Instead, State ex rel. Martinez
takes the position that its description of historical facts does not have to have its referents in
historical reality since history is what the court says it is.
Pointing out that earlier New Mexico decisions had declared that the system of prior
appropriation and beneficial use was the system in place under Spanish and Mexican law, State
ex rel. Martinez refuses to abandon the pueblo rights doctrine based on the State Engineer’s
argument that historical evidence shows that Mexico followed a system of equitable
apportionment and common use. Rather than making decisions founded on the historical
evidence before it, the court stuck to the version of history that it had created in its earlier
opinions. This was because an acknowledgment that equitable apportionment was the system
actually used would “undermin[e] the historical basis for New Mexico’s adoption of prior
appropriation as a legacy of antecedent sovereigns.” 106
The reasoning of this statement is strange. To refuse to admit that one version of history
(the pueblo water right) is inaccurate because doing so would require an admission that a second
version (equitable apportionment) is accurate, which in turn would mean that the version adopted
by the court (prior appropriation) is wrong, suggests that the court has no duty to the truth. State
ex rel. Martinez forecloses recognition of historical fact in the interest of maintaining a made up
version of the past because it cannot “reject the pueblo rights doctrine through a recognition of
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equitable apportionment without undermining” the version of history it previously endorsed. 107
What this means is that the court wants to stand by this historical fiction simply because it is its
own creation. While this at least suggests that stare decisis is a guiding principle in the case, it
does not turn out to be a reasoned or consistent one.
Such stubborn adherence to what appears to an incorrect view of history might be
validated by the fact that “once a historical interpretation has been made by the Court . . .
principles of stare decisis render the historical interpretation into law through the same common
law processes that render interpretations of case law into judicial precedent.” 108 But here the
court selectively applied the principle of stare decisis to one historical interpretation supported
by precedent—the doctrine of prior appropriation—but not to the pueblo rights doctrine, which
was also supported by the precedent created by Cartwright. It is history by judicial fiat either
way. 109 Because the court offers no principled reason for applying the doctrine of stare decisis to
some cases and not to others, its use becomes arbitrary, and the doctrine loses its value as a
restraint on arbitrary judicial decisionmaking.
D. Flawed Reasoning and the Conflict between Public Policy and Historical Rights
Since State ex rel. Martinez declines to dispute the historical determination made in
Cartwright, the court must logically begin its discussion eliminating the pueblo water right from
New Mexico law with the premise that such a right existed historically, as determined by
Cartwright. The court then faces the problem of how to get rid of the doctrine without doing
damage to the legitimacy of its prior decision—and by extension, the legitimacy of the court.
This is a difficult task. To nullify the right without a finding that the right never existed in the
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first place leaves the court exposed to charge of relieving people of their property rights as a
matter of convenience and without compensation. In order to get around its original problem
with history, State ex rel. Martinez takes another route: It finds that while the pueblo water right
may have existed under Mexican law, it was extinguished in 1848 when the Mexican
government signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. By eliminating the right in this way, State
ex rel. Martinez is more at liberty to overrule the doctrine on public policy grounds. But because
the opinion’s analysis of whether the right should be recognized under the Treaty is deeply
flawed and internally contradictory, and because the court’s discussion of the right’s conflict
with current New Mexico water law is based on its earlier irrational use of historical evidence,
the court’s public policy rationale fails on its own terms.
1. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Inchoate Property Rights
Mexico ceded almost half of its territory to the United States in 1848. 110 Under the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexicans who lived or owned property in this territory were assured that
people “now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico . . . shall be free to
continue where they now reside . . . retaining the property which they possess in the said
territories.” 111 Even absent landowners were promised that “property of every kind, now
belonging to Mexicans not established there, shall be inviolably respected.” 112
Because the treaty was not considered to be self-executing, Congress required property
owners holding title pursuant to Spanish and Mexican land grants to have their rights confirmed
by the United States government. 113 Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1891 114 establishing
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the Court of Private Land Claims, which would determine whether titles to property claimed
under Spanish and Mexican grants were valid. 115 The Act prohibited the confirmation of
inchoate rights, stating that no “grant or other authority to acquire land, made upon any condition
or requirement, either antecedent or subsequent, shall be admitted or confirmed unless it shall
appear that every such condition and requirement was performed within the time and in the
manner stated” in the grant. 116 The Supreme Court broadened this provision to mean that under
the Act, the court of private land claims could only confirm a right that had not been perfected if
“the claimant could, by right, and not by grace, have demanded that it should be made perfect by
the former government, had the territory not been acquired by the United States.” 117
Cartwright determined that the pueblo water right was a form of property protected by
the treaty and expressly stated that it was a vested right. 118 In contrast, State ex rel. Martinez
concluded that the pueblo water right was an inchoate right that did not come under the
protections of either the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo or the New Mexico Constitution. 119 The
court made this about-face by drawing an analogy between a community’s right to land granted
for community use and a city’s right to water under the pueblo water rights doctrine. State ex rel.
Martinez cited two United States Supreme Court cases holding that communal ownership of land
under Mexican law was an inchoate right not protected by the treaty. 120 In both United States v.
City of Santa Fe and United States v. Sandoval, successors to Spanish and Mexican land grants
filed petitions in the Court of Private Land Claims seeking confirmation of their property rights.
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Each case involved a land grant that permitted some portion of the pueblo to be assigned to the
community as a whole. The Supreme Court examined sources of Spanish law and found that,
unlike property allotted to individual settlers, land designated as community property remained
subject to the authority of the king, since the king was free to reassign it to private individuals. 121
Because possession of the common lands existed at the grace of the sovereign, and neither the
settlers nor the town could make a claim as of right to fee title to the property, 122 the right to such
lands was not protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 123
Under the Plan of Pitic, the pueblo water right, like the right to common lands, was
subject to the discretion of the Spanish and Mexican governments since the Plan states that
“water privileges . . .shall continue as long as they are not changed or altered by his Majesty.” 124
As a result, these Supreme Court cases would provide a pretty good foundation on which to rest
a claim that the pueblo water right did not survive the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. However, in
order to make this argument, State ex rel. Martinez has to rely on the very historical
interpretation of Spanish and Mexican water law that it had refused to recognize earlier in the
opinion: the doctrine of equitable apportionment.
The court reasons as follows:
To the extent that Spanish and Mexican law recognized a pueblo
water right, the nature of the right that allowed increased water
usage in response to growing needs of the pueblo would have been
a matter of grace, not a matter of right; future expansion of water
rights subsequent to the colonization grant would have been
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subject to the sovereign’s power of reallocation according to a
change in circumstances. 125
As the only evidence in support of the claim that antecedent sovereigns retained control over the
right to increasing amounts of water, the court cites to a sentence in a law review article stating
that “[e]ach grant petition occasioned an official reevaluation of the adequacy of water supplies
in the particular vicinity.” 126 From this single sentence, the court is able to conclude: “Thus, the
expanding quality of the water right, being inchoate, was not guaranteed by the Treaty.” 127
The problem with this line of reasoning is that the quoted sentence itself at least suggests
that water was allocated on equitable principles—for why else would a government need to
adjust water rights based on “the adequacy of water supplies in a particular vicinity” if not to
ensure the adequacy of water supplies for all the users in the area? But regardless of whether or
not reallocation would be based on equitable principles, this kind of redistribution certainly
wouldn’t comply with the doctrine of prior appropriation, which State ex rel. Martinez has
already claimed was the law under the Spanish and Mexican governments. Furthermore, an
examination of the rest of the cited article reveals that it is devoted to the thesis that pueblos, like
other water users, were allotted water rights based on a system of equitable apportionment. 128
State ex rel. Martinez therefore depends on the historical doctrine it previously rejected in order
to reach its conclusion that the pueblo water right, presuming it existed, was not protected under
125
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the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The court offers no explanation as to why equitable
apportionment was not the law of Spain and Mexico in Part A of its discussion of the pueblo
water rights doctrine, but becomes the law of Spain and Mexico in Part B, when the court wishes
to claim that the pueblo water right is not a vested right.
2. The Incompatibility of the Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine and General Principles
of New Mexico Water Law
Although State ex rel. Martinez is able to nullify the pueblo water right by claiming that,
by definition, a pueblo’s expanding water right could never be vested, this historical argument is
not the sole foundation of the court’s opinion. The inchoate nature of the right is only one of
three points in State ex rel. Martinez’s argument that the pueblo water rights doctrine is
inconsistent with the general principles of New Mexico water law. 129 The first of these points is
that New Mexico adheres to the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use. The second is
that the pueblo water right is not a vested right under New Mexico law. The third is that the
pueblo water right would make the State Engineer’s duty to adjudicate water rights more
difficult. None of these reasons provides an adequate basis for overruling Cartwright in the
absence of a determination that the right did not exist historically.
While New Mexico follows the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use, this
doctrine was not formally adopted until 1907. 130 Because this would have been after the 1835
vesting of Las Vegas’s pueblo water right (assuming that such a right existed and could be
vested) New Mexico would be obligated to respect and uphold the pueblo water right under the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the New Mexico Constitution. It is true that the protections of
the treaty have been increasingly narrowed by statute and by court decisions, such that the treaty
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might no longer protect the right. 131 However, the protections of the New Mexico Constitution
have not been so narrowed. As a result, the fact that the pueblo water right arguably conflicts
with the doctrine of prior appropriation is, under the New Mexico Constitution, not a valid
reason for abrogating the right.
Nor is the claim that the right is inchoate. At least one other court has found that a
settlement’s expanding water right was a vested right that was protected by the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. 132 The New Mexico Constitution specifically provides an exception to the
general rule of prior appropriation and beneficial use when a water right has vested before the
adoption of the constitution. 133 There is no reason that a property right that can only be realized
in the future must necessarily be considered inchoate. A vested right is defined as “[h]aving
become a completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent;
unconditional; absolute.” 134 The pueblo water right is not contingent upon any conditions, but, if,
as the court claims in one section of its opinion, it is subject to reallocation by the sovereign, it
may not properly be termed “absolute.” In this way, the inchoate nature of the right is necessarily
predicated on the fact that equitable apportionment was the law of Spain and Mexico. If, as the
court says in another section of its opinion, Spanish and Mexican law did not follow the system
of equitable apportionment, then the decision offers no factual support for its conclusion that the
right is inchoate rather than vested.
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The final reason State ex rel. Martinez offers to justify its decision overruling the pueblo
water rights doctrine is that continuing to recognize the doctrine would make it more difficult for
the State Engineer to regulate water rights. This is almost certainly true, but the court devotes
little attention to the development of this rationale. Without discussion, the court merely cites
statutes requiring the State Engineer to prepare a comprehensive state water plan, to adhere to the
requirements of interstate water compacts, and to protect and conserve water. 135 As the only
reason for its decision that is not undermined somewhere else in the opinion, the imposition on
the State Engineer is the strongest justification offered by the court for overruling the pueblo
water rights doctrine. Unfortunately, State ex rel. Martinez fails to bolster this rationale with any
significant discussion of its importance, relying instead on the claim that the pueblo water right is
inchoate and conflicts with the doctrine of prior appropriation. As a result, the court offers no
support for an argument that concerns about the complex responsibilities of the State Engineer
should outweigh the dictates of either the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo or the New Mexico
Constitution.

IV. Conclusion
State ex rel. Martinez doesn’t work because it fails meet the generic requirements of an
appellate opinion, and consequently fails to support its claim to authority. On the one hand, the
text makes use of conventional forms and relies on the types of reasoning thought necessary in a
judicial decision. These help to create a sense of the opinion’s legitimacy, and at this level, the
opinion is a success: It has sections labeled “Factual and Procedural Background,” “Historical
Basis for the Pueblo Rights Doctrine,” and so on, and it refers to prior case law, to statutes, and
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to the law of antecedent sovereigns, and discusses how these laws apply to the facts of this case.
But once past these outward signs of a valid judicial decision, the opinion falls apart.
State ex rel. Martinez erodes any authority created by its structural forms and rhetorical
conventions by failing to reach the degree of coherence and analytical integrity necessary in an
appellate court’s published decision: A supreme court opinion is not a poem, and if it behaves
like one, it has failed. State ex rel. Martinez skips from one idea to another with the hope that the
reader’s affective response to the repetitive use of motifs like stare decisis, inconsistency with
New Mexico water law, inchoate rights, and the changing nature of historical interpretation will
carry her over the logical gaps. Needless to say, the motifs don’t do the trick, and one is sorry
that the opinion seems to try.
Rather than attempting to claim that history is irrelevant in the adjudication of historical
property rights; rather than clinging to what the court offers as a judicially invented historical
scenario; rather than using the doctrine of stare decisis inconsistently to serve what may be
legitimate policy concerns, the court could have simply said that an examination of the historical
evidence currently available has made it clear that there never was an expanding pueblo water
right under Spanish or Mexican law, and overruled Cartwright on this basis. It could have then
suggested that even if it were later discovered that such a right existed, its historical validity
could not outweigh the social and environmental costs of allowing successors to colonization
pueblos to extinguish the rights of prior appropriators, or the administrative costs of asking the
State Engineer’s office to manage the adjudication of an ever-changing water right. Whether or
not that kind of an opinion would have been right on legal or policy grounds, such an approach
would have eliminated the need for all of the inconsistencies that currently detract from State ex
rel. Martinez. That kind of opinion would have worked.
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